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DOES THE SUPREME COURT IGNORE STANDING PROBLEMS
TO REACH THE MERITS? EVIDENCE (OR LACK THEREOF)
FROM THE ROBERTS COURT
Heather Elliott*
The Supreme Court is often accused of using standing doctrine to manipulate its
docket. Critics frequently see dismissals for lack of standing not as legitimate deci-
sions about jurisdiction (for example, a correct determination that a plaintiff suffered
no cognizable injury, or that the suit seeks no remedy that will redress a claimed
injury), but instead as the Court's avoidance of a sensitive merits decision or even as
bias against a particular class of plaintiffs.' So, for example, the Court's recent dis-
missal for lack of standing of the marriage equality case, Hollingsworth v. Perry,
seems to be an effort to avoid issuing a merits decision that would have precluded
further percolation of the marriage equality question among the states.
If standing is a method of docket manipulation, then we might also expect the
Court to find standing present, despite standing problems, when it wants to reach the
merits of a case. But the absence of a standing discussion is an example of manipula-
tion only if there is no standing. Many cases lack standing discussions because such
discussions are unnecessary (standing is obvious); in such cases, no manipulation has
occurred. In other cases, the absence of a standing discussion may in fact reveal a
Court ignoring standing to reach the merits-recent examples include the Affordable
Care Act case, NFIB v. Sebelius,3 and the affirmative action case, Fisher v. University
of Texas.' If such manipulation is found to be widespread, it would mean that a
* Professor of Law, The University of Alabama School of Law. Many thanks to Robert
Marshall, Penny Gibson, and Blake Beals of the Law School's library, who did the vast
majority of the database work. Kudos to Tara Grove, who organized the panel, "Standing in
the Roberts Court," for the 2014 Association of American Law Schools Annual Meeting. I
am grateful for her invitation to me to participate, her peerless management of the details,
and the opportunity to write this Essay. Thanks to my copanelists Dick Fallon, Vicky Banks,
Steve Calabresi, and Annie Woolhandler, and to our moderator, Gillian Metzger, for a fasci-
nating discussion. Thanks especially to Fred Vars, who gave me extremely helpful comments
on a mature draft of this Essay.
1 Professor Pierce, for example, studied cases in the environmental area and discovered
that federal appellate judges appointed by Republican presidents were much more likely than
those appointed by Democratic presidents to dismiss environmental plaintiffs for lack of
standing. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Is Standing Law or Politics?, 77 N.C. L. REv. 1741 (1999).
2 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
3 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
4 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
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majority of Supreme Court justices are regularly ignoring the constitution to exer-
cise power that they do not have.
To see whether this is a common strategy for the Court, a more general examina-
tion of the docket is required. Professor Staudt, for example, took the approach of
looking at all cases within a particular area (taxpayer lawsuits) and concluded that
judges sometimes manipulate standing doctrine to reach favored results, but much less
frequently than they were accused.'
The theme of this panel, "Standing in the Roberts Court," presents an excellent op-
portunity to use a different method of empirical analysis. Chief Justice Roberts joined
the Court for the October Term of 2005, and his eight terms as Chief offer a manage-
able sample of cases (a total of 638 merits opinions). Moreover, the Roberts Court is
the current Court, meaning that conclusions drawn from this analysis are relevant to
today's litigants. As I discuss below in Part II, I have identified two primary sets of
cases that would permit the accusation of manipulation: cases where the Court ad-
dressed standing, implausibly found it present, and reached the merits (what I will call
the Implausible Cases); and cases where the Court failed to discuss standing, yet the
court or courts below discussed standing extensively, suggesting that standing was at
issue in the case (what I will call the Avoidance Cases).6 These cases are particularly
worth considering because a Court concerned about its dignity seems more likely to
avoid than to include an implausible standing analysis.
I have identified only one case that I find clearly Implausible. I have identified
eighteen Avoidance Cases, which fall into three categories. First, in fourteen of the
cases, the lower courts seem to have gotten the standing question right, and the Court
does not need to examine standing any further (though, given the Court's repeated em-
phasis on the importance of determining standing before proceeding to the merits, one
might expect the Court to drop a footnote agreeing with the analysis/es below). Thus,
although these cases are technically Avoidance Cases, they are not manipulative
Avoidance Cases. Second, in three cases, including the NFIB case, standing was prob-
ably present, but the Court should have proved it; the absence of a standing discussion
may represent the Court's preference to ignore standing and reach the merits, a mild ex-
ample of manipulation.' Third, and finally, in only one case-the Fisher case-standing
Nancy C. Staudt, Modeling Standing, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 612 (2004).
6 This sample may be underinclusive. One might instead look at all cases where the Court
failed to discuss standing, as did the courts below, yet the issue was sufficiently debated in
the briefs to suggest that all of the courts ignored a real standing problem. It is also possible
that the parties and the courts all overlooked a standing problem in order to reach the merits.
I conclude-as I explain more fully below in Part 11.-that the alignment of interests that
would lead to such cases make these outcomes unlikely.
The avoidance of a standing discussion might also be an example of constitutional-
question avoidance. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288 (1936). But
avoiding a standing question would presumably mean assuming or hypothesizing jurisdiction,
something that the Court forbade in Steel Company. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better
Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998).
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was probably not present, the absence of a standing discussion is highly irregular, and
the Court has manipulated standing to reach the merits.'
Over eight terms, then, only one truly manipulative Avoidance Case and three
further mild Avoidance Cases give meager evidence that the Court does in fact ignore
standing doctrine when it wishes to reach the merits of a case. When combined with
just one truly Implausible Case, United States v. Windsor,' the manipulation thesis
(under which the Court implausibly asserts jurisdiction or improperly avoids a stand-
ing question to reach the merits) is not well supported by the cases issued during the
Roberts Court. There remains the question of whether there are numerous cases where
the Court appears to have ducked the merits by dismissing for lack of standing, and
whether there is evidence in other terms for the Avoidance, Implausible, and Ducking
aspects of the manipulation thesis.
This Essay proceeds in four Parts. In Part I, I review the cases and literature that
accuse the Court of using standing to manipulate the docket. Part II contains a descrip-
tion of the method I used to assemble the cases I have studied. I discuss the Implausible
Cases in Part III; and I provide an analysis of the Avoidance Cases in Part IV.
I. STANDING AS MANIPULATION
Standing doctrine, derived from the words "case[] or controvers[y]" in Article I
of the Constitution," requires a plaintiff to show that she has suffered, or will immi-
nently suffer, an injury in fact; that this injury is at least partly traceable to the actions
of the defendant; and that a judgment from the court will redress the injury, at least in
part." Standing is a threshold requirement for subject-matter jurisdiction, and the
Fisher, 132 S. Ct. at 2411.
* 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
10 Scholars debate whether the standing doctrine is consistent with the Founders' under-
standing of Article III. Compare, e.g., Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and Separation
ofPowers: A Neo-Federalist Approach, 81 CORNELL L. REv. 393, 478 (1996) ("[T]he Court
has properly emphasized that the Founders' conception of separation of powers reflected
their 'common understanding' about the nature of legislative, executive, and judicial power.
The law of standing, however, frustrates this shared understanding." (footnote omitted)), with
Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102 MICH. L.
REv. 689, 691 (2004) ("We .. .argue that history does not defeat standing doctrine; the notion
of standing is not an innovation, and its constitutionalization does not contradict a settled his-
torical consensus about the Constitution's meaning.").
" Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). This test for constitu-
tional standing under Article III is distinct from the question of "prudential standing," which
asks whether a party who has constitutional standing is further authorized by the relevant
merits statute to proceed. See, e.g., Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150 (1970). Prudential standing is beyond the scope of this discussion.
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Court has, for several decades, emphasized its role in maintaining the constitutional
separation of powers. 12 A case in which no party has standing to proceed must be dis-
missed, the Court emphasized, because there is no constitutional authority to proceed.
Despite the work of significant defenders,13 the doctrine is widely criticized.14 It
has been called "incoherent,"" filled with "doctrinal confusion," 6 "permeated with
sophistry,"" lacking a historical basis," and "a[] ... pointless constraint on courts." 9
The Courtitself has noted that "[s]tanding has been called one of the most amorphous
[concepts] in the entire domain of public law,"20 in part because the words "cases" and
12 "[S]tanding is built on a single basic idea-the idea of separation of powers." Allen
v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984). Some scholars have lauded this function of standing.
Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV.
23, 56-57'(1994) (suggesting that standing plays an important role in reining in "the threat
posed by the tenured and unaccountable Article III 'Executive' of the federal courts and the
public interest bar"). Others have criticized it. See Gillian Metzger, The Interdependent
Relationship Between Internal and External Separation ofPowers, 59 EMORY L.J.423,438
(2009) (criticizing "jurisdictional barriers that limit [the court's] ability to review Executive
Branch actions"). For an argument that standing doctrine is ill-suited for serving separation
of powers goals, see Heather Elliott, The Functions ofStanding, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459 (2008).
" See, e.g., MAXWELL L. STEARNS, CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS: A SOCIAL CHOICE
ANALYSIS OF SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING 282 (2000) (arguing that, given stare
decisis and the existence of public choice problems with Court voting, standing helps the
Court manage the flow of cases that create precedent); Steven G. Calabresi, The Congressional
Roots ofJudicial Activism, 20 J.L. & POL. 577, 590 (2004) (recommending that Congress
codify Lujan's standing doctrine to "strengthen the case or controversy limitations onjudicial
activism"); Tara Leigh Grove, Standing as an Article IINondelegation Doctrine, 11 U. PA. J.
CONsT. L. 781, 784 (2009) (noting that in suits against private individuals, or in which the real
party in interest is a private individual, "standing doctrine protects individual liberty by shield-
ing private parties from arbitrary exercises of private prosecutorial discretion"); Robert J.
Pushaw, Jr., Limiting Article III Standing to "Accidental" Plaintiffs: Lessons from Environ-
mental andAnimalLaw Cases, 45 GA. L. REV. 1, 82-105 (2010) (arguing that standing plays
an important role in keeping cases that have been manufactured by would-be plaintiffs out
of the federal courts).
" E.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., OfJusticiability, Remedies, and Public Law Litigation:
Notes on the Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 15-16 (1984) ("Regrettably, it
has long since become commonplace to begin any discussion of the doctrine of standing by
decrying the confusion which persists in this area of the law. This conventional introduction
remains appropriate today." (internal citations omitted)).
" William A. Fletcher, The Structure ofStanding, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 221 (1988).
6 Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization ofPublic Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV.
1432, 1458 (1988).
" 4 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 24.35 (2d ed. 1983).
18 See, e.g., Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-
Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1418-25 (1988).
'9 Jonathan R. Siegel, A Theory ofJusticiability, 86 TEX. L. REv. 73, 75 (2007).
20 Flastv. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83,99 (1968) (quoting Hearings on S. 2097Before the Subcomm.
on Constitutional Rights of the S. Judiciary Comm., 89th Cong. 498 (1966) (statement of
Professor Paul A. Freund)).
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"controversies" "have an iceberg quality, containing beneath their surface simplicity
submerged complexities."2 1
More problematic, critics describe denials of standing as merits decisions cos-
tumed as threshold jurisdictional inquiries, 22 or normative decisions about the proper
scope of government action hidden within technical jurisdictional language? A number
of scholars have said that standing doctrine is a form of substantive due process,24 re-
flecting the Court's importation of its own values into a mere phrase (here, "case[ or]
controvers[y]") in the Constitution. Such criticisms are not limited to the academy.
Members of the Court itself, in dissent, have accused majorities of using standing
as a "cover," 26 and have called the doctrine a "word game played by secret rules.""
These latter criticisms accuse the Court of using standing to manipulate its merits
docket.28 Standing may be distorted to permit a court to avoid a case, as Justice Harlan
contended had occurred in a 1976 case: "The Court's treatment of injury in fact ...
threatens that it shall 'become a catchall for an unarticulated discretion on the part of
this Court' to insist that the federal courts 'decline to adjudicate' claims that it prefers
they not hear." 29 Professor Fallon has noted this issue in the realm of remedy: if a
court fears its remedy may cost too much or intrude too much on legislative spending
21 Siegel, supra note 19, at 78.
22 See, e.g., Mark V. Tushnet, The New Law of Standing: A Plea for Abandonment, 62
CORNELL L. REV. 663, 663 (1977).
23 See, e.g., Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Rethinking Standing, 72 CALIF. L. REv. 68, 70 (1984);
Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Standing for Privilege: The Failure ofInjury Analysis, 82 B.U. L. REv.
301, 305 (2002).
24 See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 16, at 1480; see also Fletcher, supra note 15, at 233;
Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? OfCitizen Suits, "Injuries, " andArticle III,
91 MICH. L. REv. 163, 167 (1992).
25 Cf, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, The Political Economy ofSubstantive Due Process, 40
STAN. L. REv. 379, 380 (1988).
26 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 767 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
27 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 129 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
28 Of course, today's Supreme Court has extensive discretion over the contents of its docket
because of the certiorari process. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1250-1260. But because of the Rule of
Four, which provides that certiorari is granted by a vote of four justices, cases may reach the
docket of the Court over the objection of a majority ofjustices. EUGENE GRESSMAN ET AL.,
SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 323-28 (9th ed. 2007). Sometimes the Court dismisses a petition
as "improvidently granted," (called DIGging the case), but such an outcome is rare and often
criticized. See, e.g., Lyle Denniston, ArgumentRecap:A Bad Way to Open a Term, SCOTUSBLOG
(Oct. 7, 2013, 1:56 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/1 0/argument-recap -a-bad-way-to
-open-a-term/ (discussing the disappointing first day of oral argument for the 2013 Term, in-
volving a case ultimately DIGged). If not dismissed, the case is decided on the merits-unless
the Court decides it lacks jurisdiction under, for example, the standing doctrine.
29 Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26,66 (1976) (quoting Poe v. Ullman,
367 U.S. 497, 530 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)); see also Tushnet, supra note 22, at 664.
See generally Pierce, supra note 1.
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prerogatives, it may resort to arguments of justiciability to avoid the case.30 Such
avoidance is thought to be especially likely when the federal courts confront a case
containing a controversial political issue.3' (Of course, there is a vast number of cases
involving controversial questions that the Court cannot reject on standing grounds.)32
At least two studies give empirical support to the thesis that standing is used to
manipulate court decisions in favor of the political or policy preferences of judges.
For example, Professor Pierce studied a set of thirty-three cases involving environ-
mental plaintiffs and found that "a Republican judge was almost four times as likely
as a Democratic judge to vote to deny an environmental plaintiff standing."33 Professor
Staudt argues that judges act less on their political beliefs than Pierce and others have
suggested, in part due to flaws in those studies, 34 but nevertheless finds, after reviewing
almost 700 taxpayer standing cases in a statistical study constructed to remedy those
flaws, that the more scope judges have for engaging in politically motivated standing
decisions, the more likely such decisions are."
30 See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Linkage Between Justiciability andRemedies-
and Their Connections to Substantive Rights, 92 VA. L. REv. 633 (2006).
3 For example, in Allen v. Wright, the Court rejected, on standing grounds, a claim that
the IRS had failed to enforce nondiscrimination regulations against purportedly tax-exempt
schools. Allen, 468 U.S. at 747-48 & n.16. The political facts behind Allen suggest that the
Court may have been seeking to avoid a battle with the other branches. See id. Thus, the standing
doctrine does not usefully sort cases into "controversial" and "uncontroversial" categories-
a point which the Court has, in the past, recognized: "[t]he fundamental aspect of standing is
that it focuses on the party seeking to get his complaint before a federal court and not on the
issues he wishes to have adjudicated." Flast, 392 U.S. at 99 (emphasis added). Other doctrines
exist to sort issues suitable for judicial resolution: "[A] party may have standing in a particular
case, but the federal court may nevertheless decline to pass on the merits of the case because,
for example, it presents a political question." Id. at 100.
32 E.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (filing by a woman prosecuted for possessing
homegrown medical marijuana); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (filing by men arrested
for homosexual sodomy); see also Siegel, supra note 19, at 96 ("[T]he justiciability doctrines,
even if stringently enforced, still leave individuals empowered to litigate lawsuits ... that affect
all of society.").
3 Pierce, supra note 1, at 1760.
34 See Staudt, supra note 5, at 614-15.
s Professor Staudt finds that if precedent is vague, or if a decision is likely to receive little
scrutiny from a higher court, judges indulge their political preferences:
[D]istrict courts are subject to a high level of oversight and monitoring,
and this works as a powerful deterrent to political decisionmaking.... In
situations in which the appellate judges are reasonably sure the Supreme
Court will not review their decisions, they will pursue their own political
preferences irrespective of the existing legal precedent.... [T]he Supreme
Court Justices, with little oversight or institutional constraints to inhibit
them, make decisions that reflect their sincere policy preferences in cer-
tain contexts but engage in more strategic decisionmaking in others-all
in an effort to ensure they get their favored outcome.
Id. at 669.
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Accusations of manipulation are easy to make when a court denies standing in a
case and thus refuses to reach the merits. Almost any case where an environmental or
civil-rights plaintiff is denied standing leads to familiar complaints that the standing
doctrine is being abused. Even the Supreme Court, which has virtually complete dis-
cretion in determining the cases that it hears, has been accused of using standing to
get rid of cases that the majority wishes had not been taken on certiorari."
Presumably, if courts manipulate standing to avoid the merits, they might also
do it to reach the merits: they find standing present in cases where they actually
should find jurisdiction lacking, in order to issue an opinion on the merits. As I show
in Part II, I have attempted to identify the cases of the Roberts Court where standing
might have been manipulated to allow the Court to reach the merits.
II. FINDING IMPLAUSIBLE AND AVOIDANCE CASES
One might distribute cases along a spectrum from "standing" to "no standing" as
follows (I use the singular "plaintiff' for simplicity's sake, but of course many cases
have multiple plaintiffs or involve the standing of defendants on appeal):
A. Cases where no one would question the plaintiff's standing (as in a suit
claiming damages from a car accident that caused severe injuries to the
plaintiff);
B. Cases where the issue of the plaintiff's standing might be raised, but
precedent makes clear its existence (as in a citizen suit for pollution vio-
lations under the Clean Water Act by a plaintiff who regularly boats and
fishes in the relevant body of water);
C. Cases where the issue of the plaintiff's standing is raised and seriously
debated, and the outcome, whatever it is, remains debatable;
D. Cases where the issue of the plaintiff's standing is raised because prece-
dent shows that it almost certainly is lacking (as in a suit by a federal
taxpayer against federal spending that the taxpayer alleges violates any
constitutional provision other than the Establishment Clause);
E. Cases where no one would think that the plaintiff had standing (when
the plaintiff is non-Hohfeldian-a pure private attorney general37).
To present the idea graphically:
A B C D E
Standing Standing
clearly present clearly absent
31 See supra note 28.
" See Louis L. Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or
Ideological Plaintiff 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1033, 1033 (1968).
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A court that engaged in a standing analysis and then denied standing in an
A or B case, or found standing present in a D or E case, would be manipulating the
standing analysis to achieve some external goal (avoiding a merits question that it
really should address, or reaching a merits question that it really lacks jurisdiction to
hear). The former cases (denying standing in an A or B case) are beyond the scope
of this Essay; the latter cases (finding standing in a D or E case) are what I call
Implausible Cases."
A court could also manipulate standing by ignoring it. A court that failed
to engage in any standing analysis whatever, when the case is a C, D, or E case, is
ignoring an obvious question about its subject-matter jurisdiction, a question it must
address (sua sponte, if necessary) before proceeding to the merits. I call these cases
Avoidance Cases.
A. Implausible Cases
We" ran a search of the Westlaw Supreme Court database for the term
(standing /40 "article iii" "art. 3" "article 3" "art. III" injur! trace! caus! redress!) on
the assumption that any case engaging in a standing analysis would be found by that
search. The search was date-limited to the Roberts Court and it found fifty-nine cases
as of March 21, 2014. This search found some cases where the majority did not discuss
standing, but a dissenting justice did, and I reclassified those as potential Avoidance
Cases. I then eliminated any false positives (cases where, despite the limitations in the
search term, "standing" was used in its nonjurisdictional sense), 40 any cases where
the real issue was prudential standing, 41 any cases where the standing discussion was
really a side issue,42 and any cases in which the Court did not reach the merits.43 I then
" A court that squarely faces the standing issues in a C case cannot fairly be accused of
manipulation, because the outcome is debatable. Such a court may, of course, be influenced
by politics and policy preferences in how it decides the standing question; it may even tilt to-
ward or away from finding standing depending on the judge's views of the merits. But unless
the standing analysis is bogus, the case is best treated as what C cases generally are: hard cases
under standing doctrine, and not instances of manipulation.
* I relied heavily on the University ofAlabama's excellent law librarians for identifying
the universe of cases that I then analyzed.
40 E.g., Stanton v. Sims, 134 S. Ct. 3, 4 (2013) ("Sims herself was standing behind the
gate when it flew open. The swinging gate struck Sims, cutting her forehead and injuring her
shoulder." (emphasis added)); see also Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1425 (2013).
41 Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band ofPottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 132 S. Ct. 2199,
2210 (2012); Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355 (2011); Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless,
LP., 131 S. Ct. 863 (2011); Hemi Grp., LLC v. City ofNew York, 559 U.S. 1 (2010). As noted
above, see supra note 11, prudential standing is not the same as Article III standing and is
beyond the scope of this Essay.
42 E.g., Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2434 n.10 (2011); Nevada Comm'n on
Ethics v. Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. 2343, 2350 (2011).
43 This category includes cases where another threshold issue prevented the Court from
reaching the merits, see, e.g., Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2029-30 (2011) (finding
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read the remaining cases and identified those that I believed reflected an effort to over-
come serious standing problems in order to reach the merits. That determination is, of
course, subjective.
B. Avoidance Cases
Suspecting that it would be easier to work forward (from appellate cases dis-
cussing standing that then went up to the Supreme Court on certiorari) than backward
(looking at every nonstanding Supreme Court case to see if standing had been an issue
below), we ran a search in the Westlaw database of federal" appellate decisions. The
search was limited to reported cases45 after January 1, 2001 (a date range that was, we
hoped, overinclusive, to capture cases that were in the pipeline leading to potential
certiorari in the Roberts Court) that satisfied the search term (standing /40 "article iii"
"art. 3" "article 3" "art. III" injur! trace! caus! redress!).
We then identified the cases that were subject to a grant of certiorari by the
Roberts Court. We eliminated any cases that had a substantial discussion of standing
(because cases with such discussions are, by definition, not Avoidance Cases). If there
was a question about whether the discussion was substantial, the case was kept in
the pool. This produced a group of thirty-five cases. I then eliminated any false posi-
tives (as above, cases where "standing" was used in its nonjurisdictional sense),46
cases where the Court did not issue a merits opinion,47 and any cases involving solely
prudential standing.48
As noted above,49 a few cases we found in the search for Implausible Cases
were reclassified as Avoidance Cases because the majority ignored standing while
the dissent mentioned it.
standing present but finding case moot), and cases where standing was denied. This latter
category includes several notable standing decisions. E.g., Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct.
2652 (2013) (denying standing to appeal decision striking down California's constitutional
ban on marriage between same-sex couples); Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013)
(denying standing to challenge allegedly illegal wiretapping by the U.S. government); see
also Unite Here Local 355 v. Mulhall, 134 S. Ct. 594 (2013) (dismissing writ of certiorari as
improvidently granted, with Justice Breyer dissenting and noting that both mootness and
standing problems had caused the Court to dismiss).
44 Because state courts are not bound by Article III, see ASARCO v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605
(1989), a search of state-court cases is much less likely to be productive. However, the search
will be done in a future expanded version of this Essay.
45 A subsequent review of Supreme Court cases in which the underlying opinions were
unreported added no cases requiring discussion here.
46 United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012).
47 Ind. State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC, 556 U.S. 960 (2009).
48 As discussed above, see supra note 10, prudential standing is beyond the scope of this
Essay. E.g., Unitherm Food Sys. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 546 U.S. 394 (2006).
49 See supra Part II.A.
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This resulted in a group of eighteen cases. I then read the standing discussions
in the lower courts and the merits opinions from the Court itself to determine whether
the Supreme Court was ducking a standing issue in order to reach the merits. That
analysis was, of course, subjective.
Other searches that could expand this universe will be pursued in a future
project. I intend to repeat this process in the district court database to look for cases in
which the district court addressed standing but the intermediate appellate court did not,
and the Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari and did not address standing.
One could also seek cases in which the petitioners and respondents before the Supreme
Court made standing arguments in their briefs but the Court does not address them.
Another possible expansion of the search would be to try to find cases where
the parties vigorously debated standing but the lower courts did not address it. I have
no plans to pursue this avenue in this or a future project because it is virtually boiler-
plate in contemporary litigation to challenge the standing of the plaintiff, at least where
such a challenge can colorably be made. The payoffof such a search would seem small.
Naturally, the most manipulative of Avoidance Cases would be one where
everyone-all the parties, all the judges, and all the amici-colluded to ignore a stand-
ing problem. Such a case would not be picked up by any search, because standing was
not discussed in any of the reported cases. The only conceivable way to identify such
cases would be to read every Supreme Court case for the last eight terms, including
the full record below, trying to decide if a hidden standing issue was lurking. I have
decided against this approach because, given our adversarial system and given the
diversity ofjudges on the bench, I find it highly improbable that any such case could
make it all the way to a Supreme Court judgment without someone mentioning the
standing problem."o
III. THE IMPLAUSIBLE CASES
The vast majority of the cases found under this search were uncontroversial:
the Court either mentions standing solely as part of describing the lower courts'
decisions," or simply to note that standing is obvious.52 Other cases certainly involve
controversial issues, but the standing decision itself seems hard to argue with." Other
so In a future expanded version of this project, I plan to analyze a random sample of cases
to see if I find any cases that disprove these assumptions.
S E.g., Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2114
(2013).
52 Free Enter. Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3163 n.12
(2010); Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Dept. of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702,
729 n.10 (2010); Home v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 445 (2009).
13 E.g., Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1815 (2010) (finding that the United States had
waived its challenge to Buono's standing by failing to appeal in an earlier case and found
standing in the instant case based on the existing injunction granted in the earlier case: "Based
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cases involved a standing issue that certainly could have been decided either way,
but the Court's decision seems entirely plausible. For example, in Monsanto Co. v.
Geertson Seed Farms,54 the Court found standing for conventional alfalfa growers to
challenge the release of a genetically altered alfalfa plant; standing was premised on
the additional costs the farmers would have to incur in testing their crops for genetic
contamination." While questions certainly could be raised about the imminence of the
risk faced by the farmers, the Court's decision finding standing is not implausible.
Some critics" certainly would find Massachusetts v. EPA 7 and AEP v.
Connecticut" implausible for their standing conclusions, but I do not. In the former
case, the Supreme Court addressed the EPA's authority to regulate greenhouse gases
related to global climate change after finding that Massachusetts had standing to sue."
The state had shown that it was losing shoreline on account of the rising sea levels
caused by global warming. "Because the Commonwealth owns a substantial portion
of the state's coastal property, it has alleged a particularized injury in its capacity as
a landowner .... Remediation costs alone, petitioners allege, could run well into the
hundreds of millions of dollars."60 This kind of economic harm is, of course, at the
core of injury in fact.
Admittedly, the causation and redressability aspects of the case were more
complicated: the regulations at issue would control only a small category of emissions,
and gases emitted from China and India were likely to swamp any effect that the U.S.
regulations would have.62 But the majority responded plausibly: the majority held that
Article III has never required complete redress, that the federal government should be
free to take an incremental approach, and that the federal regulation, if implemented,
would certainly slow the process of global warming.63 I thus find the standing analysis
within the bounds of plausibility.'
on the rights he obtained under the earlier decree-against the same party, regarding the same
cross and the same land-his interests in doing so were sufficiently personal and concrete to
support his standing.").
54 561 U.S. 139 (2010).
5 Id. at 140.
56 See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass, Massachusetts v. EPA: The Inconvenient Truth About
Precedent, 93 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 75 (2007).
1 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
5 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011).
* Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 504-05.
60 Id. at 523 (internal citations omitted).
" See, e.g., Danvers Motor Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 432 F.3d 286, 291 (3d Cir. 2005)
("While it is difficult to reduce injury-in-fact to a simple formula, economic injury is one of
its paradigmatic forms.").
62 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 542-47 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
63 Id. at 523-25.
' Cf Amy J. Wildermuth & Lincoln L. Davies, Standing, on Appeal, 2010 U. ILL. L.
REV. 957, 959 (arguing that the problem with Massachusetts v. EPA is not the conclusion the
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I acknowledge that the case is controversial, however. It is burdened with
a lengthy discussion of state sovereignty that ultimately has nothing to do with the
actual standing analysis,65 which is suspicious. Moreover, the same justices who found
standing also clearlywanted to reverse the Bush Administration's refusal to assert regu-
latory authority over greenhouse gases. This case could thus be seen as an example
of quasi-manipulation, where justices who wanted to reach the merits allowed that
desire to influence their standing conclusion. Nevertheless, I find the standing analysis
fairly straightforward and thus do not categorize this case as Implausible.
In AEP v. Connecticut,66 the Court addressed the same standing issue, dividing
evenly (with Justice Sotomayor recused) over whether several states, New York City,
and some non-profits had standing to bring a nuisance suit under federal common law
against electrical generating plants that emitted greenhouse gases.67 Because the Court
was evenly divided, the lower court's finding of standing provided the governing law,
and the Court went on to the merits." Even if the majority had received a fifth vote for
standing (which Justice Sotomayor was likely to have provided ifnot recused), the case
does not seem an obvious example of manipulation: it involved the question whether
the federal environmental laws preempted the federal common-law nuisance action,
and the Court found that it did." Environmentalists-the constituency most associated
with broad standing-would have strongly preferred the opposite conclusion. I thus
conclude that this case is not even quasi-manipulative and certainly not Implausible.
The case I do find Implausible is United States v. Windsor,"o not for its stand-
ing analysis in isolation, but for its standing analysis compared to Hollingsworth v.
Perry." To understand my conclusion I must first lay out each case.72
Edith Windsor, who survived her wife Thea Speyer, had to pay $363,000
more in taxes after Speyer's death than a widow of a man would have paid, because
the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) did not recognize the Windsor-Speyer
marriage." Windsor challenged DOMA under the federal Constitution and the United
States (speaking through the Department of Justice) agreed with her. Rather than sim-
ply refusing to enforce what it saw as an unconstitutional law, however, the United
States pursued the lawsuit through the federal courts to obtain a court determination
Court reached, but the fact that the factual standing analysis was conducted for the first time
on appeal, in front ofjudges who know nothing about fact-gathering).
6 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 518-20. The discussion is likely included to gain
Justice Kennedy's vote (making five Justices in the majority to find standing present).
66 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2532 (2011).
67 Id.
68 Id. at 2535.
69 Id. at 2537.
70 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
" 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
72 For a more lengthy discussion of both cases, see Heather Elliott, Further Standing
Lessons, 89 IND. L.J. SUPPLEMENT 17 (2014).
71 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2679.
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that DOMA was unconstitutional. 74 The Court decided that, because Windsor had won
below and was seeking to enforce the $363,000 judgment, and because the United
States would be harmed by paying that money, Article Ill standing was satisfied.
The lack of adversity raised a prudential, but not jurisdictional concern, and the pru-
dential worries were overcome because an intervenor (the Bipartisan Legal Advisory
Group of the House of Representatives) was defending DOMA rather than the United
States.76 Thus the Court had Article Ell jurisdiction over the dispute and proceeded to
find DOMA unconstitutional.
In Hollingsworth, two gay couples brought a federal constitutional challenge
to California's constitutional ban on marriage between those of the same sex, a ban
added to the California Constitution by ballot initiative.78 As in Windsor, the govern-
ment officials (then-Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger and then-Attorney General
Jerry Brown) agreed with the plaintiffs that the law was unconstitutional.79 As in
Windsor, intervenors (the proponents of the original ballot initiative) participated to
defend the law. Despite the strong similarities with Windsor, despite the strong claim
that standing for the intervenors was necessary to vindicate the workings of California's
initiative system, and despite the fact that at least one justice thought standing in
Hollingsworth was more obvious than in Windsor,so the Court found the appellants
lacked standing." The Court found that the intervenors had not suffered the individ-
ualized harm sufficient to justify Article III standing,82 and that California had not
appointed them as agents (in the traditional principal-agent sense).8
Individually, these cases may make some sense. After all, BLAG is different
from the California initiative proponents, and a tax-refund order is different from an
injunction against enforcement of a state constitutional ban. However, it is hard to re-
sist the conclusion that the Court was manipulating standing to produce the political
74 For an excellent discussion of whether the Executive Branch even has the authority to
pursue such a lawsuit, see Tara Leigh Grove, Standing Outside Article III, 162 U. PA. L. REv.
1311 (concluding it does not have such authority).
* Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2686.
7 Id. at 2688.
7 Id. at 2696.
78 See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2659-60 (2013).
'9 Id. at 2656.
80 Windsor, 133 U.S. at 2712 (Alito, J., dissenting) ("Whether [BLAG] has standing to peti-
tion is a much more difficult question. It is also a significantly closer question than whether
the intervenors in Hollingsworth . . .have standing to appeal. It is remarkable that the Court
has simultaneously decided that the United States, which received all that it had sought below,
is a proper petitioner in [ Windsor] but that the intervenors in Hollingsworth, who represent
the party that lost in the lower court, are not. In my view, both the Hollingsworth intervenors
and BLAG have standing." (internal citations omitted)).
8 Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2688.
82 Id. at 2662-63.
83 Id. at 2665-67.
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result it wanted: (1) through Windsor, DOMA is gone, so that states wishing to pro-
vide marriage equality can now do so, but (2) through Hollingsworth, the Court has
issued no constitutional ruling on state marriage bans, so that the states are free to con-
tinue their political processes. Moreover, the arguments for standing in Hollingsworth
were, I believe, considerably stronger than those in Windsor.8 4 Thus I place Windsor
squarely within the Implausible category.
IV. THE AVOIDANCE CASES
I conclude that fourteen of the eighteen Avoidance Cases show no evidence
of manipulation, but instead are cases where the Court's lack of standing discussion
is perfectly innocent; the remaining four cases deserve an accusation of manipula-
tion, though only one (Fisher) is strongly manipulative. I divide the cases into three
categories: fourteen cases where the lack of standing analysis is innocent; three cases
where the standing question was close enough that the Court should have discussed it,
even if it agreed with the lower court's standing determination; and one case, Fisher,
where the Court failed to discuss standing even though it was probably lacking.
A. Cases Where Standing Was Almost Certainly Present and It Is Unsurprising
That the Court Did Not Discuss It
Fourteen of the Avoidance Cases do not involve manipulation." They were
included as Avoidance Cases because the courts below raised and resolved a standing
issue, and the Court subsequently addressed the merits with no reference to the stand-
ing question. However, these thirteen cases are A and B cases on the spectrum pro-
vided above." For example, in Ricci v. DeStefano," a case where several white and
one Latino firefighter challenged a promotion examination alleging reverse discrimina-
tion, the district court (relying on Second Circuit precedent) quickly found standing for
the plaintiffs. 8 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, however, did not even use the
84 See supra notes 70-83 and accompanying text; see also generally Elliott, supra note 72.
85 Agency for Intern. Dev. v. Alliance for Open Society Intern., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321
(2013); Tarrant Reg'1 Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 133 S. Ct. 2120 (2013); Ass'n for Molecular
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013); McBumey v. Young, 133 S. Ct.
1709 (2013); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557
(2009); Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008); Engquist v. Oregon Dep't of
Agric., 553 U.S. 591 (2008); Crawford v. Marion Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008); Rowe v.
N.H. Motor Transp. Ass'n, 552 U.S. 364 (2008); N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. L6pez
Torres, 552 U.S. 196 (2008); Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551
U.S. 644 (2007); Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. United States, 549 U.S. 457 (2007); Wagnon v.
Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95 (2005).
8 See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
8' 557 U.S. 557 (2009).
" See Ricci v. Destefano, 554 F. Supp. 2d 142, 160-61 (Conn. 2006) (finding standing based
on unequal treatment based on race (citing Comer v. Cisneros, 37 F.3d 775, 791 (2d Cir. 1994))).
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word standing, much less discuss the presence or absence of standing;" the Supreme
Court used the word standing, but only in nonjurisdictional senses.o The Supreme
Court presumably failed to discuss standing for the same reason that the Second
Circuit did: they agreed with the district court's two-sentence reliance on precedent.
This seems uncontroversial. The Court need not address standing in these
cases when there is no real question whether standing is present. It is conceivable that
the Court could adopt a rule that it always has to state why standing is present, but, as
I discuss below, this might highlight the problems in cases where the Court truly is
ducking a standing problem to reach the merits.91
Even the most controversial case in this group, District ofColumbia v. Heller,92
is not a case that involved standing manipulation. This case, which famously struck
down portions of D.C.'s gun control laws by finding an individual right to bear arms
under the Second Amendment,93 involved a serious question regarding standing--one
that implicates a circuit split, one on which some parties sought certiorari, and one
on which the Court denied certiorari.94 However, one plaintiff was unaffected by this
split (he had standing regardless), and the Court could reach the merits with only this
plaintiff as a party before it. This is not manipulation.
The one case that I think is a close call, and perhaps falls in the next section
rather than this one, is Agency for International Development v. Alliance for Open
Society International, Inc.95 The case is relatively controversial: it involved the First
Amendment rights of non-governmental organizations fighting HIV/AIDS and other
health problems with funding under the United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS,
Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003.96 The courts below discussed standing ex-
tensively, while the Supreme Court's majority opinion does not even use the word
89 530 F.3d 87 (2d. Cir. 2008) ("standing" does not appear in the opinion when text
is searched).
90 See Ricci, 557 U.S. at 567, 571, 599 (using the word "standing" only in the sense of
"standing alone" or "long-standing").
9' See infra Conclusion.
92 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
9 Id. at 592.
94 The Rockwell case also featured a petition over the propriety of certain parties' ability
to proceed. Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. United States, 549 U.S. 457 (2007). However, the question
on cert was not one of standing: it involved whether the relator provisions of the False Claims
Act violate Article II's Appointment and Take Care Clauses. The Court has previously noted
this Article II problem but has not addressed it. Vt. Agency of Nat'l Res. v. United States ex
rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 778 n.8 (2000) ("[W]e express no view on the question whether
qui tam suits violate Article II, in particular the Appointments Clause of § 2 and the 'take
Care' Clause of § 3."). The Court refused to grant cert here, too. Because the Court has pre-
viously held that qui tam relators have Article III standing, however, and because the lower
courts relied on this clearly established precedent, I conclude that the Supreme Court's failure
to discuss standing is innocent.
9 133 S. Ct. 2321 (2013).
96 22 U.S.C. § 7601.
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"standing." It is thus possible that the majority is avoiding a standing question in
order to reach the merits of an important case. I have ultimately concluded, however,
that this is not an avoidance case. I am swayed by Justice Scalia's dissent, which is
vehement on the merits but which does not challenge the implicit finding of standing
made by the majority. It is simply too likely that Justice Scalia would have taken the
majority to task for every mistake it made; if he does not complain about the failure
to discuss standing, there is probably not a problem.
B. Cases Where Standing Was Probably Present, but It Is Nevertheless
Surprising That the Court Did Not Discuss It
Three Avoidance Cases raised significant standing problems that were re-
solved in favor of jurisdiction by the intermediate appellate courts; the Court's failure
to discuss standing in its review of those cases could be seen as a sub silentio agree-
ment with the lower court analyses." I placed these cases in this section rather than
the previous section, however, because the standing questions were close, and one of
the cases (NFIB) changed in its standing posture after the lower court opinions were
written. I thus conclude that, for these Avoidance Cases, the Court's failure to discuss
standing in these cases is at least a mild example of manipulation.
Most notably, the Court failed to discuss standing in NFIB v. Sebelius," the
challenge to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA).99 PPACA
(particularly its "individual mandate")'o was challenged in scores of lawsuits,101 and
standing was an issue in many of those lawsuits. 102 NFIB itself was a case in which
the Obama Administration had already conceded the plaintiff's standing (although,
because Article III is a constitutional restriction on the federal court's powers, no par-
ties can confer standing by concession)."o3 Even when the named plaintiff declared
bankruptcy and a new plaintiff had to join the case, the Administration supported the
motion to substitute that party.104
9' NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012); Nat'l Aeronautics and Space Admin. v.
Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746 (2011); Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006).
9 See generally NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2566.
9 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010),
amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152,
124 Stat. 1029 (2010).
'oo Affordable Care Act § 1501. The so-called individual mandate is the provision of
PPACA that requires most Americans-with exceptions for those below certain income
levels-to purchase health insurance or face a penalty.
10' Heather Elliott, Standing Lessons: What We Can Learn When Conservative Plaintiffs
Lose Under Article III Standing Doctrine, 87 IND. L.J. 552, 575 n.159 (2012).
102 Id. at 575-78.
103 Brief for Appellants at 6 n. 1, Florida v. United States Dep't of Health & Human Servs.,
648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011) (Nos. 11-11021, 11-11067), 2011 WL 1461593.
'" Brief for Petitioners at 16 n.5, Dep't of HHS v. Florida (Jan. 6, 2012) (No. 11-398),
2012 WL 37168. The Government had challenged standing below and at the certiorari stage
but did not renew those arguments after the Court had taken the case.
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Despite this drama surrounding the standing of the lead plaintiff, neither the
majority nor Justice Ginsburg in concurrence mentions the issue of standing.'0o This
omission is surprising: given the problems with standing both below and at the Supreme
Court, one would expect at least a brief discussion of the issue.
That the PPACA case is an Avoidance Case gives at least mild evidence for
the manipulation thesis. To be sure, a number of factors support the Court's implicit
conclusion that a proper party with standing was present. The Government conceded
standing, the standing issues were fairly ordinary (involving the common-or-garden
variety of standing, economic harm), and the Court had ordered no specific briefing
on standing.' 6 However, the need for a last-minute substitution of parties makes clear
that standing before the Court was not simply a matter of implicitly approving a lower
court's findings-there had been no lower court findings on that party's standing.
Moreover, the merits of the case give rise to the suspicion that the Court would
want to reach the merits regardless of standing. The country was clamoring for a deci-
sion on PPACA, and the Court itself was split along political lines on how to resolve
the merits question. Given these facts, and the common perception that standing doc-
trine is manipulated so that courts can reach or avoid the merits as they choose,'o7
the Court probably should have addressed the standing question, even if only in a
footnote. Its failure to do so gives rise to the suspicion that, if they looked too hard,
they would find a problem with standing that would preclude a merits decision.
C. Cases Where Standing Was Probably Not Present, but the Court Reached the
Merits Anyway, Without Addressing the Standing Question
I have identified only one case in which the Court does not discuss standing,
even though there is the strong possibility that standing was lacking. That means that
the Court may well have lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and nevertheless reached
the merits. This is the strong case of manipulation, representing the worst of what
scholars have accused courts of doing with the standing doctrine. The fact that I could
find only one case in eight terms, however, shows that this kind of strong manipulation
is rare.
This case is Fisher v. University ofTexas.os The word "standing" appears no-
where in the Court's opinion, but it had been an issue in the Fifth Circuit (which found
that the plaintiffs had no standing to pursue injunctive relief)'. and in the briefs (the
University of Texas suggested the plaintiffs had no standing for any form of relief)."0
"o NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). The Chief Justice does address one threshold
jurisdictional matter: whether the Anti-Injunction Act bans the suit. Id. at 2581-84.
106 Id.
"0' See supra notes 12-31 and accompanying text.
los 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
109 Fisher v. University of Texas, 631 F.3d 213, 217 (5th Cir. 2011).
Brieffor Respondents at 16-17 n.6, Fisher v. University of Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013)
(No. 11-345).
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On remand, the Fifth Circuit asked for further briefing on standing."' The University
argued that Fisher lacked standing to pursue her claims.1 2 In its ultimate remand opin-
ion, the Fifth Circuit noted its concern that Fisher lacked standing but concluded that
the Supreme Court's remand required it to reach the merits."'
Several commentators have already suggested that the Court lacked jurisdiction
over the case because Fisher lacked standing."' Erwin Chemerinsky calls the Court's
failure to discuss standing and other jurisdictional issues "inexplicabl[e]."" Yet the
Fisher Court's avoidance of standing is explicable if it is manipulative avoidance: the
Court wanted to address the merits of affirmative action, did not want to be prevented
from doing so by a standing problem, and did not want to be embarrassed by what
would have been an extremely implausible standing analysis.
To be fair, Fisher may reflect less the Court's manipulation to reach the merits
as much as the Court's avoidance of a quagmire. Even if the Court had addressed
standing, it would have been faced with one of the most confused areas of standing
doctrine." 6 The Court's affirmative action standing doctrine has long been viewed
as convoluted and inconsistent with standing doctrine more generally (and, given the
criticisms of standing doctrine more generally, this is saying something)."' It is thus
." Letter from Lyle W. Cayce, Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, to
Counsel, Fisher v. Texas (Sept. 12, 2013), http://www.utexas.edu/vp/irla/Documents/2013
.9.12.Scheduling.Order.pdf.
112 Supplemental Brief for Appellees at 6-19, Fisher v. University of Texas, 758 F.3d 633
(5th Cir. 2014) (No. 09-50822).
"' Fisher v. University of Texas, 758 F.3d 633, 638-41 (5th Cir. 2014) ("Fisher's ... scores
were [such that] she could not have received an offer of admission to the Fall 2008 freshman
class. If she had been a minority the result would have been the same. This reality together with
factual developments since summary judgment call into question whether Fisher has standing.
[B]ut in our view the actions ofthe Supreme Court do not allow out reconsideration [of Fisher's
standing]. The Supreme Court did not address the issue of standing, although it was squarely
presented to it. Rather, it remanded the case for a decision on the merits." (footnotes omitted)).
114 E.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Court Affects All of Us: The Supreme Court Term in
Review, 16 GREEN BAG 2D 361, 363 (2013) ("I strongly believe that the Court did not have
jurisdiction to hear the case" due to lack of standing, as well as Eleventh Amendment issues);
Danielle Holley-Walker, Defining Race-Conscious Programs in the FisherEra, 57 How. L.J.
545, 555-56 (2014) ("One issue that has become a focus on rehearing, and may ultimately
impact the outcome of the case, is whether Abigail Fisher has standing to continue . . .
"' Chemerinsky, supra note 114, at 364.
116 See Ryan H. Nelson, Injury in Fiction, 66 VAND. L. REV. 153, 162-63 (2013).
"' E.g., F. Andrew Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 CORNELL
L. REv. 275, 304 (2008) (noting that the Court, in the affirmative action context, "has recog-
nized injuries that are a far cry from the 'concrete' and 'palpable' injuries that the Court pur-
ports to require"); Richard M. Re, Relative Standing, 102 GEO. L.J. 1191, 1201-02 (2014)
(noting that the injuries accepted as sufficient for standing in affirmative action cases are not
acceptable in other substantive contexts); see also, e.g., Ashutosh Bhagwat, Injury Without
Harm: Texas v. Lesage and the Strange World ofArticle III Injuries, 28 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 445, 448-51 (2001); Harvard Law Review Association, Leading Cases: Standing to
Challenge Affirmative Action Programs, 107 HARV. L. REV. 144, 303-12 (1993).
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possible that the Court was simply avoiding a confrontation with the reality of its
affirmative action standing jurisprudence.
Some, however, have contended that affirmative action standing is more
than confused: it is intentionally (or unconsciously) warped to the benefit of racial
majorities and other privileged groups."' On this latter view, the Court's failure to
evaluate Fisher's standing to sue returns this Avoidance Case into the malign cate-
gory of manipulation.
I cannot help but find Fisher manipulative. The Court had many options: it
could have dismissed the case as improvidently granted, it could have taken on the
standing analysis and found that Fisher lacked standing, or it could have engaged in
what would likely have been an Implausible analysis and proceeded to the merits.
That it took none of these path and instead decided the merits without even a refer-
ence to the standing problem is, I think, evidence of the strong (and reprehensible)
form of manipulation.
CONCLUSION
I attempted to identify every case during the tenure of Chief Justice Roberts
in which the Court should have addressed standing before reaching the merits but did
not, or addressed standing and reached an Implausible result on standing in order to
reach the merits. In those eight terms, I identified only one case that I feel strongly is
Implausible, only one Avoidance Case in which the Court probably lacked j urisdic-
tion to issue its merits opinion, and three further mild Avoidance Cases. This is a very
small number when compared to the 538 merits opinions issued by the Roberts Court.
This is not evidence upon which to base any strong accusations that the Court has
a strategy of ignoring or stretching Article III standing doctrine when it wishes to
reach the merits of a case.
The manipulation thesis is therefore not supported by the cases issued during
the Roberts Court. There remains the question of whether there are numerous cases
where the Court appears to have ducked the merits by dismissing for lack of stand-
ing, and whether there is evidence in other terms for the Avoidance, Implausible, and
Ducking aspects of the manipulation thesis. Those questions are left for another day.
"' Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Standing for Privilege: The Failure oflnjury Analysis, 82 B.U. L.
REv. 301, 309,311-12 (2002) (arguing that "the toughest issue in standing law arguably is deter-
mining when the injury requirement will be taken seriously and when it will be ignored" and
contending that it is ignored to the benefit of white challengers of affirmative action programs);
Christian B. Sundquist, The First Principles ofStanding: Privilege, System Justification, and
the Predictable Incoherence ofArticle III, 1 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 119 (2011).
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